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Translated version. The Polish text is binding.

The case

OLAF reports — an overview

What the reports of the European Anti-Fraud Office are, what follows from them and what they do not determine.

OLAF reports are the starting point for proceedings against Polish logistics companies. We explain their significance in plain language — without publishing the documents themselves, which are confidential and contain data on specific entities.

Some of the content has not been translated yet — the Polish version is shown.

Fact

What is an OLAF report?

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) conducts investigations into losses to the EU budget, including in the area of customs duties. Once the investigation is complete, it draws up a final report and forwards it to the authorities of the Member States, who decide on the next steps.

Fact

What do the reports on this matter concern?

According to the findings of the authorities, in some rail shipments from China in 2021–2022, the goods were declared as sports equipment (exercise bikes), whereas the containers were alleged to have contained electric bicycles and scooters subject to high anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The transit was completed in another EU country.

The final reports were submitted to Poland in 2024; decisions regarding Polish companies will be taken in 2025–2026.

Legally disputed issue

How influential are these reports?

An OLAF report constitutes admissible and relevant evidence in national proceedings — in case law, it is sometimes treated as an official document. However, it is not a judgement and does not determine who is the customs debtor. This must be determined by the national authority on a case-by-case basis for each entity, and the party must be given the opportunity to present counter-evidence.

Position of businesses

What is known about the goods, and what about the companies’ knowledge?

Determining what goods were in the container is a different matter from determining who knew or ought to have known about the discrepancy. According to those attending the meeting of the Sejm sub-committee, the reports did not identify the carriers as liable — the decision to expand the group of debtors rests with the national authorities.

Position of businesses

Access to reports

Some reports and annexes are excluded from the public case files, and the parties are not permitted to view them. We believe that in cases based on multi-page reports, genuine access to the material is a prerequisite for the right to a defence.

Fact

The European Commission’s position

In 2026, the European Commission, in response to a complaint concerning the practices of the Polish authorities, confirmed that a carrier may be a customs debtor if the conditions of Article 79 of the UCC are met — but not on the basis of the carrier’s status alone. It is necessary to examine the specific unfulfilled obligation and, in some cases, also the carrier’s knowledge or duty to know.

The Commission did not find any systemic practice contrary to EU law, citing a lack of sufficient evidence, and reiterated that it is not an appeal body for individual decisions.

Fact

Two final reports from 2024

The case is based on two final OLAF reports prepared by the unit responsible for customs and trade. The first was signed in July 2024, the second at the end of October and beginning of November 2024. Both are the result of external investigations conducted pursuant to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, involving the exchange of information with Member States under the mutual assistance procedure (Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97).

OLAF forwarded the first report, together with its recommendation, to the Head of the National Revenue Administration at the end of July 2024. The recommendations were also forwarded to the customs authorities of Belgium and Hungary, as well as to the law enforcement agencies of Poland and Hungary, and OLAF notified the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Certified translations of the reports are available to the parties. The document containing the recommendation itself – that is, the indication of from whom and on what grounds the claims should be recovered – is not included in the materials.

Fact

How the mechanism worked, according to OLAF

The investigation began following information from the Polish customs authorities in July 2021 regarding containers being unloaded at a warehouse in Poland. The analysis covered transit operations from July 2020 to March 2023; the report also describes subsequent cases.

The established pattern was as follows : - containers arrived by rail from China at the Małaszewicze border crossing, where a transit procedure (T1) was initiated to the office of destination, mainly in Belgium or Hungary; - goods other than those actually imported were declared for transit — items such as exercise bikes, furniture and floorboards were declared as ‘cover goods’, whilst the containers actually contained, amongst other things, electric bicycles and scooters, clothing, footwear and e-commerce parcels; - transit procedures were closed in Belgium with a confirmation of arrival, although according to OLAF the containers travelled directly from Małaszewicz to warehouses in Poland; - upon release for free circulation (procedure 42, with VAT suspension), goods were declared as duty-free or subject to low duty, whilst shell companies with fictitious invoices were listed as importers; - false transport documents were intended to show onward shipment for VAT purposes, whilst the consignees did not declare intra-Community acquisitions.

Electric bicycles are subject to a 6 per cent customs duty, an anti-dumping duty of up to 70.1 per cent and a countervailing duty of up to 17.2 per cent; the stationary bicycles declared in their place are subject to a 2.7 per cent customs duty.

Fact

Who played what role in the scheme

The report describes the roles without assessing criminal liability : - an intermediary and freight forwarder from China — supplied documents for transit and clearance, arranged road transport and paid for clearance; according to OLAF, he must have been aware of the discrepancies; - front companies — nominal importers who were not the actual purchasers (OLAF identifies around 50 such companies, mainly Hungarian); - an intermediary which arranged for transit operations to be opened and organised delivery to Polish warehouses — according to OLAF, it must have been aware of the infringements; - customs agencies and tax representatives in Belgium, as well as warehouses closing transit procedures without the goods — according to OLAF, they should have been aware of the discrepancies; - a customs agency at the border and a road haulier — they acted on the intermediary’s instructions; - e-commerce warehouses in the EU — the first points of unloading.

Fact

Scale according to reports

The first report estimates the shortfall at approximately €118.4 million in customs duties and approximately €79.7 million in VAT. OLAF notes that this is a conservative estimate, covering only consignments of homogeneous goods — it was not possible to calculate customs duties for e-commerce parcels.

Selected figures from the report :- approx. 2,200 transit operations opened in Poland between 2020 and 2023, of which several hundred were selected for analysis; - in Polish X-ray inspections, 54 out of 60 consignments checked contained goods other than those declared; - according to information from a road haulier, out of several hundred transit operations closed in Belgium, the goods actually arrived there in only a few dozen cases; - OLAF estimates there are approximately 173,000 undeclared electric bicycles; - over 50 unloading points, mainly in Poland.

The second report concerns the seizure by the Polish authorities in February 2024 of approximately 20,000 electric bicycles, which, according to OLAF, prevented a loss of approximately €8 million in customs duties and €4 million in VAT.

Fact

What the reports say about rail carriers

The first report describes an on-site inspection at an operator organising rail transport between China and Europe and explicitly states that the operator was not a subject of the investigation, but was inspected as a holder of relevant information. The operator explained that it works mainly with Chinese logistics companies and does not cooperate directly with importers or exporters.

The report does not identify rail carriers or terminal operators as perpetrators or as entities that knew or ought to have known about the irregularities — such assessments are made in relation to intermediaries, Belgian customs agencies and warehouses. The railways feature in the findings primarily as a source of evidence: rail consignment notes from China showed either the actual goods or a description different from that in the declaration.

OLAF reiterates the general principle that a carrier accepting goods whilst aware that they are in transit is responsible for presenting them at the office of destination — this is a citation of the provision, not a finding against a specific company.

Legally disputed issue

Legal basis for the debt as indicated by OLAF

According to the report, customs debt in Poland arose pursuant to Article 79 of the EU Customs Code (failure to fulfil obligations — failure to present goods, removal from customs supervision), whilst in Belgium and Hungary it arose pursuant to Article 77 (import declarations). The place where the debt arises is determined by Article 87.

OLAF describes a broad range of potential debtors under Article 79(3): the person liable, any person who knew or ought to have known and acted on their behalf or participated in the act, as well as any purchaser or holder who knew or ought to have known. It also notes that the actual purchasers of the goods may have assets from which the debt can be recovered — in contrast to front companies and intermediaries from China.

It is for the national authorities and courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether and which Polish entity meets these criteria.

Fact

OLAF’s reservations and weaknesses in the legislation

OLAF emphasises that the investigation was of an administrative nature: it establishes the facts for further financial action and does not prejudge criminal liability, and the amounts are estimates. Many issues — including who was actually behind the front companies — require further investigation by national authorities. At the request of the public prosecutor’s office, the opportunity for the parties concerned to submit their views has been postponed.

The report highlights weaknesses in the legislation and systems : - the lack of a definition of ‘importer’ in the Union Customs Code; - the absence of an obligation to specify the carrier and the frequent omission of commodity codes in transit declarations; - the lack of an automatic link between transit and import; - the risk of combining transit with procedure 42.

The second report points out that the seizure and confiscation of goods may lead to the extinction of the customs debt (Article 124(1)(e) of the UCC).

Fact

What evidence do the reports draw upon?

According to reports, OLAF utilised, amongst other things: - transit data from EU systems and VAT data (VIES, returns); - bank transfers; - archived X-ray images from the border and the results of physical inspections; - rail consignment notes issued in China, as well as road haulier documents and routes; - email correspondence containing instructions to open transit procedures; - information from e-commerce platforms and courier operators; - reports on on-site inspections and coordinated inspections across several countries.

The first report has 34 annexes — summaries of transit shipments, comparisons of transit shipments with imports, inspection reports and a calculation of duties due. The annexes contain thousands of source documents; we are not publishing them as they contain company and personal data.

Position of businesses

Co dalej

  • zestawienie wielu postępowań: przepis, obowiązek, rola firmy, dowody wiedzy, wyniki odwołań — jako materiał dla instytucji krajowych i unijnych;
  • wnioski o umorzenie na zasadzie słuszności i o wstrzymanie wykonania decyzji;
  • jasne standardy należytej staranności na przyszłość, żeby kolejny raport nie uruchomił kolejnej fali decyzji.

This overview is general and for information only. We do not publish scans of reports or data on individual companies.

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Polish logistics and rail companies are paying for other people's customs fraud. Customs-debt decisions threaten jobs, public revenue and the future of the Asia–Europe rail corridor. OLAF reports — an overview https://bronimylogistyki.pl/en/raporty-olaf #CustomsDebt #Logistics #Rail #Poland

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